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'AI Force' and the AI Tsar: Big Moves, Zero Mechanisms

Kael Zhang
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Author: Yongliang Version: v2 (lieflat whitelist de-AI-flavor cleaning, v1→v2)


Pin down the time first. September 19, Saturday, several posts on Truth Social: announcing the formation of an “AI Force” and comparing it to the Space Force in the first term; simultaneously announcing the appointment of a new AI Tsar. On the same day, a vote was launched to rename Artificial Intelligence, with candidates being Superior, Extreme, and Supreme Intelligence, on the grounds that the original name is inaccurate and inelegant; by 12:45 PM Saturday, over 27,000 people had voted. This issue is written within the 48-hour window after the 09-19 launch. The excitement is one thing, but what is truly worth asking is: in this set of moves, which one is a pre-emptive regulatory mechanism that can actually be implemented?

What Happened

Stating facts according to the official stance, all from first-hand reports by Reuters, The Hill, USA TODAY, AFP.

In the 09-19 announcement, AI Force had no structure, no responsibility details, and no timeline; the White House did not respond to requests for comment. Statements within the same post ecosystem can be grouped into three layers: it will not hinder or stifle the growth of the industry in any way; AI Force’s job is to catch bad guys; the existing criminal and civil justice systems are sufficient to control AI.

The renaming vote is another thread on the same day. The over 27,000 votes by Saturday noon is no small scale, but the vote itself does not change any institutional arrangement; its function is closer to a mobilization.

Connecting the dots from the previous few days. On 09-14, he posted that AI does not need guardrails, the only guardrail needed is a strong and smart president. Earlier, he called concerns about AI doomsday a scam and styled himself a scam-buster; he also called AI the greatest economic development engine in history, surpassing oil, gold, and diamonds, potentially accounting for a quarter of the US economy in the future.

This term will see the second AI Tsar. The first, David Sacks, stepped down this spring to become an external advisor; the vacancy in this position itself indicates the actual weight of the so-called AI regulation head on the agenda.

Big Moves, Zero Mechanisms

“Big moves” needs no argument: a branch-level agency plus a national renaming vote are both headline-grabbing moves. The problem lies in the other half: looking at the regulatory philosophy spread out.

Catching bad guys. AI Force’s duty is described as finding bad things. But where the bad lies, who judges it, and by what standard—there are no answers. The bulk of AI risk is precisely that bad guys cannot be identified in advance: model capabilities are only gradually understood after release, and harms only become visible after scaling. An agency with catching bad guys as its core duty presupposes that bad guys are visible in advance, a premise that does not hold for AI.

Post-hoc accountability. The stances of the predecessor and the presumptive successor mirror each other. Sacks said at an event on Wednesday that developers should bear their own safety responsibilities, and if problems arise, they can be held accountable; no new federal regulations are needed. The new stance is that the existing judicial system is enough. Both paths lead to the same destination: settling scores after something happens. Yet judicial accountability can only handle damages that have already occurred; risks like training accidents, systemic bias, and model loss of control cannot be solved by post-hoc compensation judgments regarding pre-emptive prevention. The aviation industry was not built on rules established by lawsuits after crashes, nor was the pharmaceutical industry. Obama used exactly this analogy in his speech at Colgate University on Friday, arguing that the government must regulate AI, criticizing the “market will solve” argument, and stating that there will be at least a few more years of a regulatory vacuum.

Personalized guardrails. The 09-14 post placed the entire security guarantee of AI on one person’s judgment. This swaps mechanism for trust. What institutional design must answer is precisely: when this person misjudges, shifts attention, or changes stance, are the guardrails still there?

Putting the three-piece set together, the common ground is clear: none of them can stop anything before an accident occurs.

The Same Week, Another Set of Answers

Spreading out the time, there is another thread in Washington in the same week.

Anthropic CEO Dario Amodei posted a long article last week calling for slowing down the capability growth of frontier models, with Musk and Altman rarely jointly endorsing it. Former Anthropic researcher Jacob Coxon’s warning was more blunt: among those working in this field, quite a few genuinely believe it could kill all of us before the end of this decade. On 09-15, the Future of Life Institute held a Pro-Human Assembly in Washington, with Sanders and Bannon sharing the stage, and Tegmark, Stuart Russell, and Ashley Judd attending. This left-right mix lineup itself shows that concerns have crossed the partisan divide.

On the government side, Obama’s speech on Friday demanded regulation, and the party is not entirely in sync: Hawley and Husted are pushing legislation related to data security and data centers, and House Speaker Mike Johnson said both guardrails and industry self-discipline are needed. In other words, former presidents, bipartisan senators, industry leaders, and safety researchers all stood on the “need rules” side this week. The announcement of AI Force happened to appear in this same week when these calls were densest.

Worth Watching

First, the chain of attribution. The regulatory agenda is being taken over by two forces: the election cycle and the narrative of great power competition. With the midterm elections on November 3 approaching, the set of stances—“not hindering growth, catching bad guys, economic growth engine accounting for a quarter of the economy”—every sentence speaks to voters and capital. The external agenda is also pushing: on Thursday he will meet with the Chinese leader, and on Sunday the US Treasury Secretary will talk with Chinese officials in New York about AI safety and economy and trade. The competition between Washington and Beijing on AI makes “deregulation to maintain competitiveness” the easiest position to export. The problem of technical governance is being rewritten into a topic of political performance.

Second, public opinion is not buying it. Multiple polls show that Americans generally oppose AI data centers being built in their own communities. The growth narrative speaks to macro numbers, but at the community level, it translates to electricity, water, land, and noise. The rift between these two sets of books will only become more obvious before the midterm elections.

Third, the metaphor of the renaming vote. The three candidate words for renaming AI look more like a brand launch than the last. The moves pursue perception; mechanisms require rules. In all the content posted continuously on Saturday, the former is in ample supply, the latter is zero.

Conclusion

The conclusion of the audit of words and deeds is simple: announcing a new branch-level agency and launching a national vote, the moves are undeniably big; but spreading out the three-piece set—catching bad guys, post-hoc accountability, personalized guardrails—none are pre-emptive rules. The regulatory vacuum will not disappear because of a name change or a new sign. The next two points truly worth watching are: who will be the AI Tsar, and will AI Force provide a structure and timeline; and after the talks in New York on Sunday, whether the statements on AI safety between Washington and Beijing will in turn affect the domestic stance. The standard answer in an election year is usually performance, but AI risks do not operate according to the election calendar.

References

  • Reuters (2026-09-19): Announcement of AI Force and AI Tsar, no structure, no responsibilities, no timeline, White House did not respond; stance of not hindering growth, catching bad guys, judicial system is enough; Sacks’ statement on Wednesday and background of the first Tsar; arrangements for Thursday meeting and Sunday talks
  • The Hill (2026-09-19): AI renaming vote (candidate words, reasons for renaming, 27,000+ votes at 12:45 PM Saturday); legislative moves by Hawley and Husted; statement by House Speaker Mike Johnson
  • USA TODAY / AFP: Summary of recent stances (doomsday scam theory, guardrail theory on 09-14, economic development engine and economic proportion); attendance lineup for Pro-Human Assembly and Coxon’s warning
  • Mediaite: Obama’s speech at Colgate University on 09-18 (government must regulate, analogy to aviation and pharma, criticism of “market will solve” theory, judgment on regulatory vacuum).
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Frequently Asked Questions

What is the AI Force agency?

As of the announcement day, it is not yet any defined agency: no structure, no responsibility details, no timeline, and the White House did not respond to comment requests. The announcer compared it to the Space Force in the first term, but the flip side of the comparison is that when the Air Force and Space Force were established, they both had organizational structures and budget bills, whereas AI Force currently only has a name and a job description of "finding bad things."

Why criticize the regulatory philosophy of this combination as "zero mechanisms"?

Spreading out the stance reveals a three-piece set: catching bad guys—but the bulk of AI risk cannot identify bad guys in advance; model capabilities are only gradually understood after release, and harms only become visible after scaling; post-hoc accountability—the judiciary can only handle damages that have already occurred, it cannot solve pre-emptive prevention; rules in the aviation and pharmaceutical industries were not established by lawsuits after crashes; personalized guardrails—placing all security on the judgment of one leader, while institutional design must answer exactly whether the guardrails are still there when this person makes a mistake, shifts attention, or changes stance. None of the three can stop anything before an accident happens.

What was the industry's internal attitude in the same week?

Almost standing on the other side. Anthropic CEO Dario Amodei posted a long article last week calling for slowing down the capability growth of frontier models, with Musk and Altman rarely jointly endorsing; former Anthropic researcher Jacob Coxon warned that "quite a few people in this field genuinely believe it could kill all of us before the end of this decade"; on 09-15, the Future of Life Institute held a Pro-Human Assembly in Washington, with Sanders and Bannon sharing the stage; Obama argued in his speech on Friday that the government must regulate, criticizing the "market will solve" argument. Former presidents, bipartisan senators, industry leaders, and safety researchers all stood on the "need rules" side this week.